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Openness to experience—the enjoyment of novel experiences, ideas, and 
unconventional perspectives—has shown several connections to cognition that suggest 
open people might have different cognitive processes than those low in openness. People 
high in openness are more creative, have broader general knowledge, and show greater 
cognitive flexibility. The associative structure of semantic memory might be one such 
cognitive process that people in openness differ in. In this study, 497 people completed a 
measure of openness to experience and verbal fluency. Three groups of high (n = 115), 
moderate (n = 121), and low (n = 118) openness were created to construct semantic 
networks—graphical models of semantic associations that provide quantifiable 
representations of how these associations are organized—from their verbal fluency 
responses. The groups were compared on graph theory measures of their respective 
semantic networks. The semantic network analysis revealed that as openness increased, 
the rigidity of the semantic structure decreased and the interconnectivity increased, 
suggesting greater flexibility of associations. Semantic structure also became more 
condensed and had better integration, which facilitates open people’s ability to reach 
more unique associations. These results were supported by open people coming up with 
more individual and unique responses, starting with less conventional responses, and 
having a flatter frequency proportion slope than less open people. In summary, the 
semantic network structure of people high in openness to experience supports the 
 
retrieval of remote concepts via short associative pathways, which promotes unique 
combinations of disparate concepts that are key for creative cognition.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Why are open people creative? There’s a wealth of research that supports the 
relationship between the Big Five dimension of openness to experience (hereafter, 
openness) and creativity. But only a handful of studies have investigated possible 
processes that facilitate their association. For instance, open people have a general 
tendency to explore and diversify experiences (DeYoung, 2014), which has been shown 
to enhance cognitive flexibility—the ability to break old cognitive patterns, overcome 
functional fixedness, and make novel associations between concepts (Guilford, 1967; 
Ritter et al., 2012). Moreover, other factors, such as the motivation to learn and obtain 
broad general knowledge, also contribute to the connections between openness and 
creativity. 
So far, few studies have examined underlying cognitive factors—such as the 
organization of memory—that might support their association. Recent research has 
investigated the structure of semantic memory and found that creative people have more 
flexible, interconnected associations between concepts than people who are less creative 
(Kenett, Anaki, & Faust, 2014). Given these findings, the structure of semantic memory 
might be a cognitive factor that is also linked to openness to experience. Thus, the present 
study compared the organization of semantic associations across high, moderate, and low 
levels of openness using a computational network approach. 
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Semantic Networks  
Semantic memory is our knowledge about the world, such as word meanings, 
concepts, and categorization of facts (Jones, Willits, Dennis, & Jones, 2015). The 
structure of semantic memory was first investigated in a seminal paper by Collins and 
Quillian (1969), who found semantic memory was organized into hierarchical categories, 
starting from more general to increasingly specific exemplars. Their ideas set the 
foundation for semantic memory to be investigated as categorizations of within-level and 
between-level features, which have connections that extend across an association 
hierarchy. They proposed that semantic memory could be represented as a sprawling web 
of highly structured associations between concepts—like a network (Steyvers & 
Tenenbaum, 2005). Furthermore, Collins and Loftus (1975) theorized that search through 
semantic memory was the result of activated associations between concepts. Their theory 
of spreading activation suggests that the organization of associations can affect the 
efficiency of search and the amount of associations available in memory. Finally, 
Anderson (1983) proposed the ACT model, which suggests that cognitive units (e.g., 
semantic concepts) form an interconnected network where retrieval is supported by 
spreading activation throughout the network. Moreover, the level of activation determines 
the rate and probability of recall as well as the potential for interference of retrieval. In 
this way, associative strength and proximity indicate the likelihood a semantic concept 
will be retrieved from long-term memory. 
Despite these pivotal experiments, the complexity of semantic relations has made 
measuring the structure of semantic memory a difficult problem. The development of 
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network science and computational graph theory, however, has provided a way to make 
meaningful inferences into the organization of semantic memory by using web-like 
graphs to investigate the associations between concepts. 
 Over the last decade, networks have been used by an expanding number of 
scientific disciplines to model complex phenomena and to reveal underlying structure in 
otherwise large, chaotic sets of data (Barabási, 2012; Newman, 2010). In theory, a 
network is simple. A network is a graph with nodes—vertices—connected by edges—
relations—to other nodes. In an undirected network, edges are bidirectional; in a directed 
network, relationships are directional. In addition to direction, edges can be weighted, 
which signifies the strength of a relationship between two nodes. In a semantic network, 
it’s common to represent a node as an exemplar of a category (e.g., an animal) or an 
association to a target word (e.g., spoon), and edges—undirected and unweighted—as the 
semantic relatedness between exemplars or word associations (Borge-Holthoefer & 
Arenas, 2010; De Deyne et al., 2016; Kenett et al., 2013). Connections between nodes in 
a network form paths, a sequence of associations from a starting node to an ending node, 
so that distances between nodes suggest relational differences in the network. The 
number of edges between two nodes is called a path length, which has important 
implications for network structure. Finally, cliques are connections between a set of three 
nodes that form a fully connected subgraph (i.e., a triangle). 
 There are many different ways to measure network structure that imply 
quantifiably different meanings. For example, macro measures examine organization of 
the entire network and characterize global features, while micro measures investigate the 
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influence—the connections and positions—of individual nodes in the network 
(Boccaletti, Latora, Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006; Borge-Holthoefer & Arenas, 
2010). For the purposes of this study, I’ll focus on macro measures and interpret their 
meaning with reference to semantic networks. 
 The average shortest path length (ASPL) is the mean distance between any two 
nodes in the network. The ASPL is often referred to as degrees of separation: lower 
values suggest greater interconnectivity between all nodes in the network (Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998). In semantic networks, short path lengths represent smaller distances 
between category exemplars like axolotl and albatross, while greater ASPL suggests 
greater distance between all exemplars (Faust & Kenett, 2014). Another important 
measure is the clustering coefficient (CC), which refers to the extent to which two 
neighbors of a node will be neighbors themselves—that is, whether two connected nodes 
will both be connected to a third node. In this way, the CC represents how “cliquish” the 
network is and indicates finer, more localized organization of semantic information.  
Semantic networks range on these two measures of topology (i.e., ASPL and CC) 
from regular (ordered) to random (chaotic; Faust & Kenett, 2014). Regular networks 
have large clustering coefficients and high ASPL, with connections to their neighbors and 
their neighbors’ neighbors—referred to as a lattice. Random networks are poorly 
clustered (small CC) and mostly have cross-network connections characterized by small 
ASPL values. Networks that make up the intermediate spectrum are called “small-world” 
networks, which have large CC and small ASPL (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). For visual 
representation of regular, random, and small-world graphs, see Figure 1. Small-world 
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networks have been reported in many phenomena, including semantic networks (Borge-
Holthoefer & Arenas, 2010; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005). A small-worldness measure 
can be computed by comparing the CC and the ASPL of the networks generated by the 
data to an equivalent random graph. The formula for small-worldness is expressed as: 
 
S =  
𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶 (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)
𝐴𝑆𝑃𝐿
𝐴𝑆𝑃𝐿(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)
 
Networks are considered “small-worlded” when this ratio is greater than one (Humphries 
& Gurney, 2008). In semantic networks, small-worldness (S) measures the degree to 
which the network has a high clustering coefficient and small ASPL. Higher S allows 
more flexibility and efficient access to associations in a semantic network, with more 
shortcuts between localized conceptual relations (Benedek, Kenett, Umdasch, Faust, & 
Neubauer, 2017; Borge-Holthoefer & Arenas, 2010). An increasing small-worldness 
measure without structure, however, reflects increasing “chaos” or randomness (Faust & 
Kenett, 2014; Kenett et al., 2016a). Thus, lower small-worldness suggests decreased 
flexibility and increased order between associations. Lower small-worldness, specifically 
higher ASPL, typically means a wider diameter (D) because connections are relatively 
limited in their cross-network connectivity and there is more distance between remote 
concepts. A small diameter suggests a tight, condensed network, which promotes shorter 
links between concepts in the network. In general, D, ASPL, and S measures are directly 
related. 
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Finally, modularity (Q) is a measure of network communities or 
compartmentalized sections of a network. Greater modularity suggests greater 
partitioning, which is represented by segregated groupings of nodes in the network 
(Newman, 2006). In a semantic network, these groupings suggest sub-categories of a 
larger category. For example, in a network of animals, sub-categories might be pets, 
neighborhood, and zoo animals. Therefore, modules signify meso—mid-level—structure 
(Borge-Holthoefer & Arenas, 2010). Higher modularity grants greater structure to a 
semantic network but at the cost of lower flexibility and more rigid categorizations, 
which is seen in some clinical samples (Faust & Kenett, 2014; Kenett, Gold, & Faust, 
2016b). Therefore, modularity measures structural properties of the network as well as 
the rigidness of associations. In summary, an effective balance of structural (Q and 
ASPL) and chaotic (S) properties reflects optimal semantic integration between rigidity 
and randomness (Benedek et al., 2017; Faust & Kenett, 2014; Kenett et al., 2016a). 
 Semantic networks can help us understand the complex and convoluted 
organization of semantic memory structure (Borge-Holthoefer & Arenas, 2010; De 
Deyne et al., 2016; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005). Semantic memory is an important 
function in human cognition that affects language, how we categorize information about 
the world, and our ability to recognize situations. Using network models, we can glean 
valuable inferences about the development of language, second languages, differences in 
cognition, and psychological disorder (Borodkin, Kenett, Faust, & Marshal, 2016; De 
Deyne et al., 2016; Kenett et al., 2016b; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005; Vitevitch, Chan, 
& Roodenrys, 2012). Representing semantic information in networks allows us to ask 
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many questions: What is the structure of semantic memory? Do semantic networks 
complement biological networks? Or, as I explore below, how does semantic memory 
structure relate to personality traits, specifically openness to experience? 
Openness to Experience, Cognition, and Semantic Memory 
 Why would openness to experience be related to semantic memory? One reason is 
that openness to experience, more than any other personality trait, is linked to several 
different cognitive abilities such as intelligence, working memory, and creativity 
(DeYoung, 2014; DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, & Gray, 2014; Kaufman et al., 2010). 
Indeed, in an examination of behavioral, affective, and cognitive processes related to Big 
Five personality traits, openness to experience was found to be epitomized by cognition 
(Zillig, Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 2002). Moreover, openness has also been linked to 
memory processes such as the experience and usage of autobiographical recollections 
(Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). The use of autobiographical recall has been shown to 
support the strategic search of semantic memory, allowing more efficient retrieval from 
long-term memory (Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2014). 
Finally, there are theoretical connections that suggest there should be significant 
links between semantic memory and openness to experience (DeYoung, 2014, 2015). For 
example, semantic memory has been proposed as the root of imagination (Abraham & 
Bubic, 2015) and central to creativity (Mednick, 1962). These processes—imagination 
and creativity—are considered to be core characteristics of people high in openness to 
experience (DeYoung, Grazioplene, & Peterson, 2012; Oleynick et al., 2017; Saucier, 
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1992). But despite these intermediary connections, the relation between semantic 
memory and openness to experience have yet to be empirically examined. 
 The association between crystallized intelligence and openness to experience is a 
common finding in the personality and individual differences literature. In the Carroll-
Horn-Cattell (CHC) model of intelligence, crystallized intelligence is defined by the 
acculturation of knowledge over time, including language, information, and concepts of a 
specific culture (McGrew, 2009). The breadth and depth of this knowledge is acquired by 
formal and informal education as well as general life experiences (McGrew, 2005). For 
example, open people are more likely to spend their time reading fiction, non-fiction, and 
fantasy book genres for pleasure (Finn, 1997; Mar, Oatley, & Peterson, 2009; McManus 
& Furnham ,2006). Thus, they engage with semantic and verbal information more often 
than people low in openness to experience, making them more likely to accumulate more 
semantic knowledge. Moreover, because open people have a tendency to engage in a 
broad diversity of experiences, it’s likely that they accrue a lot of general knowledge. 
Indeed, longitudinal evidence has shown that early stimulation seeking is related to 
greater general intelligence at later ages (Raine et al., 2002). Raine and colleagues 
suggest that these curious children create enriched environments for themselves that 
stimulate cognitive development. 
Open people’s curiosity and motivation to learn is a hallmark of the trait, which 
makes them more likely to explore and invest in many knowledge domains (Kashdan, 
Rose, & Fincham, 2004; Silvia & Sanders, 2010). They also tend to be higher in a 
cognitive process called implicit learning—the ability to unconsciously detect patterns of 
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covariance in sensory or cognitive information—which might support the acquisition of 
general knowledge beyond motivation. Implicit learning has been shown to be uniquely 
associated with verbal intelligence, independent of general intelligence, and is not related 
to working memory (DeYoung, 2014; Kaufman et al., 2010). Thus, open people have a 
drive for deeper knowledge and may implicitly acquire more knowledge from their 
experiences (Bates & Shieles, 2003; DeYoung et al., 2012). 
This notion is supported by a meta-analysis of personality and intelligence, which 
found moderate correlations between openness and general (β = .33) and crystallized (β = 
.30) intelligence along with knowledge and achievement (β = .28; Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997). Ashton, Lee, Vernon, and Jang (2000) also found openness to be 
moderately correlated with crystallized intelligence (r = .37) and a composite score of 
general intelligence (r = .29). Hence open people tend to have broader general knowledge 
than those who are less open, which suggests they have more information to draw from 
when retrieving semantic concepts. 
 Openness to experience has a long history and many connections to creativity. At 
one time, there was even consideration of “Creativity” as an alternative label for 
openness to experience (Johnson, 1994). People high in openness are described as 
imaginative, intellectual, curious, unconventional, original, and creative (McCrae & 
Costa, 1997; Saucier, 1992). They are also described as having an affinity to seek out, 
detect, comprehend, and utilize abstract, semantic, and sensory information (DeYoung, 
2011; Kaufman, 2013). The summation of this disposition, termed cognitive exploration, 
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promotes flexible interpretations of the world that can facilitate creative and innovative 
ways of solving problems (DeYoung, 2014, 2015). 
Flexible cognition is considered a core component of creativity (Dietrich, 2004; 
Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Indeed, diverse experiences, which are regularly sought 
out by open people, have been shown to enhance cognitive flexibility (Ritter et al., 2012). 
Consistent with exploration of experiences, open people are motivated to engage in the 
creative process and have more everyday creative hobbies (Prabhu, Sutton, & Sauser, 
2008; Silvia et al., 2014; Tan, Lau, Kung, & Kailsan, 2016). Moreover, openness is 
related to real-world creative achievement. Openness to experience is the most consistent 
predictor of creative achievement in the arts and sciences (Feist, 1998; Kaufman et al., 
2016). Thus, open people have the ability and motivation to realize creative solutions. 
 One of the most influential models of creativity is the associative theory of 
creativity (Mednick, 1962). Mednick’s seminal theory emphasized the structure of 
concepts in semantic memory and suggests that differences in the organization of these 
concepts influence people’s ability to reach remote and subsequently more creative 
solutions. He theorized that creative individuals have a “flat” association hierarchy—
more, broader associations—and less creative individuals have a “steep” association 
hierarchy—fewer, stereotypical associations. A flat hierarchy suggests lower associative 
strength between concepts: conventional associations are not overly dominant and permit 
other, less probable associations to come to mind. In contrast, a steep hierarchy has high 
associative strength between concepts: conventional connections remain dominant and 
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inhibit reaching more remote relations. Therefore, flat hierarchies are more likely to 
generate remote concepts to flexibly combine and form creative associations. 
Remote associates test. To examine his theory, Mednick developed the Remote 
Associates Test (RAT; Mednick & Mednick, 1967), which provides participants with 
three seemingly unrelated words (e.g., cottage, swiss, cake) and asks them to find a single 
fourth word that is related to each (e.g., cheese; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). The 
RAT is a widely used measure of semantic creativity that associates with creative 
language tasks such as metaphor comprehension (Arden, Chavez, Grazioplene, & Jung, 
2010; Gold, Faust, & Ben-Artzi, 2012). 
Although the task examines the ability to form associative elements into novel 
and remote combinations, there has been some debate about whether the RAT actually 
measures creativity (Lee, Huggins, & Therriault, 2014; Taft & Rossiter, 1966). Most of 
the literature suggests that the RAT is a convergent thinking task (has a single correct 
answer), which is supported by relationships to other measures of convergent thinking 
such as working memory and intelligence (Harris, 2004; Lee & Therriault, 2013). Other 
studies have examined the task with divergent thinking measures—broad, open-ended 
problems with no single solution—and found significant associations (Benedek, Könen, 
& Neubauer, 2012; Kenett et al., 2014). Finally, one study examined the RAT with both 
convergent and divergent thinking tasks, and found relations to intelligence, divergent 
thinking, creative achievement and openness to experience (Benedek et al., 2012). This 
suggests that the task may involve components of both convergent and divergent thinking 
(Klein & Badia, 2015). 
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In relation to semantic memory, Gupta, Jang, Mednick, and Huber (2012) found 
creative individuals were less biased toward high-frequency responses and performed 
better, solving more difficult RAT problems. This supports Mednick’s idea that creative 
individuals are less likely to consider high frequency responses, reflecting lower 
associative strength and a flat association hierarchy. Based on the connections between 
openness, creativity, and the RAT, evidence suggests that open people are likely to have 
weaker associations between concepts. Therefore, people high in openness are expected 
to have more unconventional and unique associations that are facilitated by a more 
flexible semantic structure. 
Divergent thinking. Divergent thinking (DT) is a common proxy for measuring 
cognitive flexibility and is considered a hallmark of creative cognition (Guilford, 1959). 
DT is usually measured by alternative uses tasks (AUTs), which require the participant to 
come up with unusual and novel uses for ordinary objects (e.g., bricks, boxes, knives). 
AUTs involve many cognitive components related to creative cognition such as the 
inhibition of common uses, cognitive flexibility, conceptual expansion, and the 
combination of disparate concepts to form unique associations (Gilhooly, Fioratou, 
Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Guilford, 1967; Hass, 2016). 
Traditionally, these tasks are scored by fluency (number of ideas), flexibility (how 
often a person switches categories), and originality (statistical infrequency of responses; 
Guilford, 1967). There have been some criticisms of this method, such as the confound of 
fluency with originality (Silvia, Beaty, & Nusbaum, 2013; Silvia et al., 2008). To avoid 
this confound, an alternative approach using subjective creativity ratings was developed 
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(Silvia et al., 2008). This subjective method has become more common in the literature 
because of its reliability, ease of scoring, and consistency with real-world creativity. 
Despite different methods of scoring, open people overwhelmingly perform better on 
these tasks (Batey, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2009; McCrae, 1987; Silvia et al., 
2008). 
Newer methods for scoring have been developed using semantic distance, which 
offer an objective alternative for rating originality and flexibility (Dumas & Dunbar, 
2014; Forster & Dunbar, 2009; Harbison & Haarmann, 2014; Hass, 2017). For example, 
a recent study used a novel technique—pointwise mutual information—to measure 
semantic distance, which correlated strongly with subjective ratings of originality and 
performed better than participants’ own assessments of their creativity (Harbison & 
Haarmann, 2014). Typically, semantic distance of DT responses has been determined by 
latent semantic analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997), which judges semantic 
similarity of the word based on its co-occurrences with other words in a large corpus of 
text. Hass (2017) found the semantic distance of DT responses increased with the number 
of responses produced, which is consistent with the serial order effect—ideas get more 
creative as time goes on (Beaty & Silvia, 2012). His evidence suggests that ideas get 
more creative over time because people are reaching more remote associations. In the 
context of semantic networks, spreading activation is diffusing to greater distances to 
arrive at less probable relations.  
LSA has also been used on other semantic creativity tasks to measure the 
remoteness of associations (Beaty, Christensen, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2017; 
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Green, 2016; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, 2014). For instance, Prabhakaran et al. (2014) 
examined the semantic distance of verbs from nouns that were produced during a verb 
generation task. Participants were cued to be creative or not when coming up with verb 
responses. Prabhakaran and colleagues found greater semantic distance was associated 
with higher DT scores of fluency, flexibility, and originality, which suggests that the 
ability to think of remote verb associates is also related to divergent thinking ability. 
They also included measures of openness and creative achievement, which were related 
to creativity-cued semantic distance. These studies provide evidence that’s in line with 
Mednick’s theory and that supports the role of remote semantic associates in creative 
cognition. Their findings also suggest that open people are more likely to reach more 
remote associates and have more unique associations. 
 Since Mednick’s seminal theory, other theories of creative cognition have 
emerged, and all suggest the structure of associative memory is critical for creative 
cognition (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014; Gabora, in press; Sowden, 
Pringle, & Gabora, 2015). The organization of semantic memory, for example, has been 
implicated in the phenomenon of insight. Insight problems involve overcoming 
functional fixedness, making remote associations, reconstructing problems, and are 
typically accompanied by an “Aha!” or “Eureka!” moment upon reaching a solution 
(DeYoung, Flanders, & Peterson, 2008; Weisberg, 2015). Schilling (2005) proposes a 
small-world theory of insight, which promotes efficient search and associative processes 
when considering solutions. She suggests that short path lengths—characteristic of small-
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world networks—act as “shortcuts” to access remote associations and facilitate the 
flexible search through possible solutions. 
Despite this theory, empirical investigation into the individual differences of 
insight problem solving and semantic structure have yet to be examined. Other studies, 
however, have revealed a small-world structure of semantic memory is related to more 
creative achievements and the facilitation of unique conceptual combinations (Kenett et 
al., 2016a; Marupaka, Iyer, & Minai, 2012). Moreover, shorter associative pathways have 
been associated with better performance on divergent thinking tasks (Rossmann & Fink, 
2010). 
 In support of these findings, one study examined semantic memory structure in a 
Hebrew sample of high and low creative groups. Kenett and colleagues (2014) used a 
free association task—participants produce as many associates as they can to a target 
word—with 96 cue words from 24 categories to construct their networks. Decision tree 
analysis was used to form high and low creative groups, which were constructed using 
scores from the RAT, a metaphor comprehension task, a battery of divergent thinking 
tasks that were translated to Hebrew (Wallach & Kogan, 1965), and a shortened version 
of Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Van der Elst et al., 2013). Behavioral results show that 
the high creative group generated more unique associations to target words (n = 7,617) 
than the low creative group (n = 5,557). The high creative group’s network, compared to 
the low creative group, appeared visually denser (see Figure 2), which was apparent by 
smaller ASPL and diameter values. Moreover, the high creative group’s network was 
more small-world and less modular, indicating a more flexible and efficient structure than 
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the less creative group. Partial bootstrapped networks were constructed to statistically 
validate the results. The high creative group had significantly larger CC and S values 
along with lower ASPL and Q measures, confirming the full network findings. Finally, 
the high creative group was found to have significantly more positive impact nodes and 
the low creative group had significantly more negative impact nodes, which suggests that 
the high creative group might have more efficient activation spread in the network.  
This notion was supported by a recent study using a random walk technique—an 
algorithm that performs a random search through the network—on the same two groups, 
which showed the high creative group reached more semantically distant associations 
than the low creative group (Kenett & Austerweil, 2016). Moreover, the high creative 
group was less likely to return to previous responses, avoiding repetitiveness and possibly 
interference. In essence, Kenett and colleagues demonstrated highly creative people have 
a more flexible and efficient semantic structure than less creative people, which 
facilitates greater access to remote associations and decreased dominance of conventional 
associations. Their evidence supports Mednick’s view that creative people have a flat 
association hierarchy and demonstrates that they have shorter associative pathways to 
disparate concepts. 
The Present Research 
The present research is the first to examine personality with semantic network 
analysis. Based on the evidence presented above, associative processes of cognition have 
notable influence on the structure and accessibility of semantic memory. Because open 
people have broad general knowledge, are cognitively flexible, and have many 
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connections to creativity, I expect that they will have different semantic memory 
structure than those low in openness. To examine differences between levels of openness, 
the sample was split into three groups—low, moderate, and high. The networks were 
organized into groups because of the statistical constraints associated with measuring 
individual networks in the sample (Moreno & Neville, 2013). Using three groups 
provided an advantage that allowed the investigation into stepwise trends across groups. 
Finally, categorical fluency data (i.e., animals) were used to generate the nodes in the 
network. Fluency data was collected because it is easier to collect than free recall tasks—
verbal fluency tasks are short (i.e., 1 min.) and they offer greater insights into categorical 
knowledge structure. While different semantic categories have been used for this task, the 
animal category is the most widely used, as it is more universal and has shown only 
minor differences across different languages and cultures (Ardila et al., 2006). Moreover, 
because there is a well-known hierarchical structure of the animal category (i.e., the 
animal kingdom in biological taxonomy), its less likely that the semantic network 
representations will be affected by openness to experience. 
 Beginning with behavioral hypotheses, I expect that the high openness group will 
have more unique responses than the moderate and low openness group, and the 
moderate group will have more than the low group. This hypothesis is informed from 
previous work on semantic networks and creativity, which demonstrated creative people 
come up with more unique associations to target words (Kenett et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, considering open people tend to have broader general knowledge, I expect 
that they would generate more unique and individual associations than less open people. 
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Moreover, analyses were conducted to determine if the high openness group started with 
more unconventional responses than the other openness groups. Given that people high in 
openness have a tendency toward unconventionality, I predict that the high openness 
group will be less likely to start with common responses. In addition, spreading activation 
suggests that starting in an alternative location of a semantic network would enable 
people high in openness to have better access to more remote associations. Finally, the 
frequency proportion of responses were used to detect the “flatness” of each group’s 
association slope. An equal or lower frequency proportion for the most common 
responses and an equal or greater frequency proportion of the least common responses 
would suggest a flatter association slope. Thus, I expect that the high openness group will 
have a smaller slope, suggesting a flatter association slope than the other groups. 
For the network analysis, I expect that the high openness group will have the most 
flexible and efficient structure of all groups. Consistent with previous creativity 
networks, this means that the high openness group will have the highest small-worldness 
measure and the lowest ASPL value. Furthermore, the high openness group is expected to 
be the least rigid, which will be quantified as having the lowest modularity value. 
Conversely, I predict that low openness people will have the most rigid network, which 
will result in the highest Q and ASPL values. Because the diameter is directly related to 
the ASPL, it’s expected that the high openness group will have the smallest diameter and 
the low openness group will have the highest. There are no predictions for the clustering 
coefficient of the networks, but I calculated this measure for comparison and the small-
worldness measure. Furthermore, there were no predictions for the moderate group, but 
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they were used to examine whether the measures demonstrated any stepwise effects (i.e., 
linear or quadratic). To obtain quantifiable data to test these predictions, I used a 
bootstrapping method that’s been used in previous semantic network research (Kenett et 
al., 2013, 2014, 2016a). In conclusion, the structure of each group-level of openness is 
expected to increase in terms of network efficiency and flexibility. Table 1 describes the 
expected effects as levels of openness increases from low to high.
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were obtained from three different studies at UNCG. The first sample 
was collected during the Fall semester of 2015 through UNCG’s psychology SONA 
research pool. The total sample obtained was 311 people, but 63 people were removed for 
missing data and 34 for inattentive responding. The remaining sample of 214 (52% 
Caucasian, 35% African American) consisted of primarily young adults (M = 19.12, SD = 
3.26, 85% female) enrolled in psychology courses. 
The second sample was collected during the 2016 Fall semester and 2017 Spring 
semester. A total of 262 participants were recruited using UNCG’s psychology SONA 
research pool. There were 64 participants excluded for missing data and 41 for inattentive 
responding, which left 157 in the remaining sample. The remaining sample (54% 
Caucasian, 41% African American) consisted of young adults (M = 18.60, SD = 1.10, 
80% female) who were enrolled in a UNCG psychology course in one of the two 
semesters. 
The third sample was obtained from an ongoing fMRI study that provided 132 
total participants. Six of these participants were removed for missing data, leaving 126 in 
the remaining sample. People were recruited using fliers around the UNCG campus and 
local newspaper ads describing an fMRI study on creativity. People were compensated 
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with $100 for completion of the study. This study had several exclusion and inclusion 
criteria: participants must be right-handed, have no past psychiatric disorder, and cannot 
currently be taking any medication. People were excluded if any of these restrictions 
were met or if they were unable to complete the neuroimaging procedures (e.g., 
unremovable piercings, claustrophobia). These participants were adults (M = 22.68, SD = 
6.09, 72% female) drawn from the community and student population at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro (70% Caucasian, 25% African American). This sample 
specifically oversampled art, music, and science majors to increase the sample’s 
population of creative domains. 
In summary, the final sample consisted of 497 people who completed the same 
personality and verbal fluency measures. 
Materials 
Openness to experience. Across the samples, two personality scales—NEO-PI-3 
and NEO-FFI-3—were used to measure openness to experience. The NEO-PI-3 is a 240-
item Big Five personality inventory that has been widely used around the world (McCrae, 
Costa, & Martin, 2005). The NEO-FFI-3 is a shortened version of the NEO-PI-3. The 
NEO-FFI-3 openness to experience scale has good internal reliability (self-report α = .78, 
informant α = .78) when compared with the NEO-PI-3 (McCrae & Costa, 2007). The 
NEO-PI-3 has six items per facet—ideas, values, fantasy, action, depth, aesthetics—for 
48 items total, and the NEO-FFI-3 uses two items per facet for 12 items total. Both 
measurements include items like I think it’s interesting to learn and develop new hobbies 
and I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas. People responded using a 5-
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point likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Because all 
of the questions used in the NEO-FFI-3 are used in the NEO-PI-3, only the 12 items that 
are included in both were used to form an average openness score. 
Verbal fluency. To assess semantic associations, the verbal fluency task of 
animals was used. People were asked to generate as many category exemplars as they 
could for animals in one minute. The task was scored for number of responses, excluding 
invalid responses, repetition, and variations on roots. These responses were used to form 
the adjacency matrix that is discussed later. 
Construction of groups. The samples were pooled and people were sorted by 
their standardized score of openness to experience. Three groups were made from low 
openness (n = 118, < -.9 SD), moderate (n = 121, -.2 < SD < .2), and high (n = 115, > .9 
SD). This split gave distinct cut-offs that allowed groups of relatively equal sizes to be 
compared. Eighty-four people between the low and moderate group and 59 between the 
moderate and high openness group did not contribute to the adjacency matrices or group 
analysis. Partitioning openness into three groups instead of high and low groups allowed 
analysis of both linear and non-linear effects. 
Semantic network construction. The fluency data were analyzed using a 
recently developed semantic network approach (Kenett et al., 2013). In this approach, 
each node represents a category exemplar (e.g., frog) and edges represent correlations 
between exemplars, more specifically, in the sample how often word b is generated given 
that word a is generated. This means that if frog is generated with lizard (32 out of 100 
people) and frog is generated with goat (3 out of 100 people), there would be a greater 
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correlation between frog and lizard than frog and goat. The size of this correlation 
matters because, later in the process, the data will be screened for weak or spurious 
correlations. In our example, frog and goat would be considered a weak correlation, so 
they would probably not share an edge in this semantic network, but frog and lizard 
probably would. 
To start, a response matrix is created that includes all common responses from all 
groups. Then the matrix is constructed so each row contains all of the responses for a 
single person, and each column is a unique response given by the sample. If a person 
gives a response, a 1 is placed in that column’s cell, and if not, a 0. Therefore, when 
complete, a row should have 1’s and 0’s in its entirety. To compare the networks between 
the groups, I analyzed only the responses that are generated by at least two participants 
(Kenett et al., 2013, 2014; van Wijk, Stam, & Daffertshofer, 2010). Two responses are 
required for later analysis when the responses are correlated between people—one 
response cannot be correlated. Due to later constraints on spurious correlations, many of 
the least frequent responses will be omitted anyways. 
Next, the word correlations are computed from the data matrices using Pearson’s 
correlation. Correlations are created from the word generation profile (number of 
participants who generated that specific word). The more similar connections a word has 
with another word, the higher the correlation between them. This is done for all words 
that have at least two entries, creating a correlation matrix between all the pairs of words 
in the sample. 
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The matrix is examined as an adjacency matrix of a weighted, undirected 
network. With this approach, each word represents a node in the network and the edges 
between two words represent the correlation between them. The weight of the edge is 
indicated by the correlation between two nodes. Therefore, an adjacency (or connectivity) 
matrix corresponds to an n x n matrix, where n is the number of words (nodes) and each 
cell represents a correlation between two words. Most of the edges will have small values 
or weak correlations, which represent noise in the network. To overcome this obstacle, 
the Planar Maximally Filtered Graph (PMFG) method was used, which constructed a 
sub-graph capturing the most relevant information within the original network (Kenett, 
Kenett, Ben-Jacob, & Faust, 2011; Tumminello, Aste, Di Matteo, & Mantegna, 2005). To 
examine the structure of the networks, the edges are binarized so that all edges are 
converted to the same weight: 1. Thus, the networks are analyzed as unweighted and 
undirected networks. 
Network analysis. Analyses were performed with the Brain Connectivity 
Toolbox for Matlab (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). Several network measures were 
calculated for analyses: clustering coefficient, average shortest path length, diameter, 
modularity, and small-worldness. 
Procedure 
Across all samples, people completed all tasks and scales on computers using 
MediaLab (v2012; Empirisoft, 2004). Participants provided informed consent to 
participate in the study and received research credit or $100 in cash for their 
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participation. All studies were approved by the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro’s Institutional Review Board. 
Statistical Approach 
Common early responses. To evaluate if the high openness group started with 
fewer conventional responses compared to the other openness groups, polynomial 
ANOVAs were conducted on the proportion of the two most common responses (i.e., cat 
and dog) for the first, second, and third responses given by each participant. If a 
participant responded with either cat or dog, then they were given a 1, if not, then 0. 
Tukey’s HSDs were used to examine pairwise differences in conventional response 
proportions between groups. Lower proportions of a common response would suggest 
lower dominance of early conventional associations—one feature of a flat association 
hierarchy as well as a tendency towards unconventionality. 
Association slope. To examine the association slope of the responses included in 
the network analysis, the frequency proportion of each response was plotted across all 
groups. The ordering of the responses was based on the total average proportion (from 
largest to smallest) of each response across all groups. This was done to keep the 
response ordering consistent between groups so that qualitative comparisons could be 
made. Because of the logarithmic distribution of the frequency proportions, all 
proportions were log-transformed prior to all analyses. The slope can be interpreted as the 
decreased log-likelihood from the most frequent response to the next—that is, the rate at 
which the logarithmic frequency proportion decreases with each response. Moreover, the 
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intercept can be interpreted as the log-likelihood of providing the most common 
response. 
Network analysis. Currently, statistical hypothesis testing methods that are able 
to compare between networks are lacking (Moreno & Neville, 2013). This is due, in part, 
to difficulties in collecting a large sample of empirical networks. A bootstrap method will 
be used to overcome these limitations (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). Bootstrapping is a 
statistical tool developed to create a random sampling distribution from an empirical 
sample by resampling with replacement. A large number of random samples (1 to 2 
thousand) are created through a large number of iterations (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). 
Using the bootstrap method, random partial networks that consist of sub-networks taken 
from each group’s network (Kenett et al., 2013, 2014). Bootstrapping generates many 
partial lexical networks, making it possible to examine differences between networks, 
which has been used in a number of other semantic network studies (Bertail, 1997; 
Kenett et al., 2014, 2016). An in-house Matlab code was written for the partial networks 
procedure. Half of the nodes are randomly chosen and used in the bootstrapping 
procedure. From here, partial networks are constructed for each group separately for 
these random words. Lastly, for each partial network, the CC, ASPL, Q, D, and S 
measures will be computed. The procedure is simulated with 1,000 iterations. 
 The dependent variables were the network measures: clustering coefficient, 
average shortest path length, modularity, diameter, and small-worldness. The 
independent variable was the openness groups, which were modeled using polynomial 
ANOVAs. Power for the study was calculated using GPower (v3.0.10; Faul, Erdfelder, 
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Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Effects for each network measure were examined across groups 
(n ≈ 100 each, about 300 total) using an analysis of variance. Power analysis (β = .80) 
showed, with equal sample sizes of 100, that effect sizes .0289 (η2) and above will be 
detected. Medium (.0625) and large (.16) effects will be detected, but small effects (.01) 
will probably not be reliable (Cohen, 1992). 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Behavioral Analyses 
Descriptive statistics of age, openness, and number of verbal fluency responses 
are reported for the full sample and each openness group in Table 1. With a age as the 
dependent variable, the openness groups had a quadratic trend, F(1, 344) = 4.58, p = 
.033, ηp
2 = .01, but no linear trend, F(1, 344) = .00, p = .99, ηp
2 = .00, for age. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the moderate openness group was not different in age from the 
high (p = .16) and the low (p = .15) openness groups. Similarly, the high openness group 
did not differ in age from the low openness group (p = 1.00). With gender as the 
dependent variable, there were no linear, F(1, 344) = 1.36, p = .24, ηp
2 = .00, or quadratic 
trends, F(1, 344) = .024, p = .88, ηp
2 = .00, for gender. Prior to verbal fluency analyses, 
all duplicate responses were removed and plural responses were changed to their singular 
form (i.e., cats  cat). There was a linear trend for the average number of responses per 
person across the openness groups, F(1, 351) = 15.13, p < .001, ηp
2 = .04, but no 
quadratic trend, F(1, 344) = .85, p = .36 ηp
2 = .00. Tukey’s HSD comparisons revealed 
that the high openness group provided significantly more responses per person, on 
average, than the moderate (p = .017) and the low (p = .001) openness groups. The 
moderate and low openness groups did not differ in the average number of responses per 
person that were provided (p = .47). 
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Individual and Unique Fluency Responses 
Polynomial ANOVAs were used to examine the linear and non-linear differences 
in the number of individual and unique responses across all groups. Across all groups 
there were 321 individual responses, with a linear trend of how many individual 
responses were given by each group, F(1, 960) = 47.97, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05, but no 
quadratic trend, F(1, 960) = .16, p = .69 ηp
2 = .00. Post-hoc comparisons were conducted 
using Tukey’s HSD. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the high openness group 
provided 257 individual responses, which was significantly more than the moderate (n = 
221; p = .005) and the low (n = 177; p < .001) openness groups. The moderate openness 
group also provided significantly more individual responses than the low openness group 
(p < .001). Similarly, there was a linear trend for the number of unique responses, F(1, 
960) = 31.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03, but no quadratic trend, F(1, 960) = 1.72, p = .19 ηp
2 = 
.00. Pairwise comparisons found that the high openness group had significantly more 
unique responses (n = 68) than the moderate (n = 33) and the low (n = 21; both p’s < 
.001) openness groups. The moderate and the low openness groups did not differ in the 
number of unique responses (p = .22). Qualitative inspection of these unique responses 
reveals that the high openness group had both breadth (e.g., axolotl, binturong, galago, 
ibis, tegu) and depth (e.g., beagle, boxer, doberman, pit bull, shiba inu) of associations, 
signifying broad and deep knowledge of the category (Table 2). 
Early Common Responses  
There were significant linear, F(1, 351) = 5.59, p =.019, ηp
2 = .02, and quadratic, 
F(1, 351) = 10.53, p = .001, ηp
2 = .03, trends for the first response proportions of the 
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common responses. Pairwise comparisons found the high openness group had a 
significantly lower proportion of the common responses (.46) than the moderate (.71, p < 
.001) and the low openness (.61, p = .049) groups. Despite the significant trends, the low 
openness group’s proportion was not different from the moderate openness group (p = 
.24). For the second response proportion of the common responses, there was a 
significant quadratic trend, F(1, 351) = 6.97, p = .009, ηp
2 = .02, but no linear trend, F(1, 
351) = 1.36, p = .24 ηp
2 = .00. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the moderate openness 
group had a greater proportion of the common responses (.80) than the high openness 
group (.63, p = .013) but not the low openness group (.70, p = .21). The low and high 
openness groups’ proportions were not significantly different (p = .47). Finally, there 
were no linear, F(1, 351) = .56, p = .45, ηp
2 = .00, or quadratic, F(1, 351) = .30, p = .59, 
ηp
2 = .00, trends for the third response proportions of the common responses. 
Preprocessing for Network Analysis 
In order to construct comparable networks, I standardized the fluency data into 
matrices that included responses that were provided by at least two participants in each 
group, across all groups. In this process, participants who provided responses that 
included multiple species of an animal (e.g., blue jay, cardinal, chickadee, oriole), but not 
the common response (i.e., bird), were given the common response if the specific species 
was not included in the analyses. Across all groups, there were 102 common individual 
responses that were included in the network analysis. This means that there were many 
individual responses that were not included from each group. A polynomial ANOVA 
found that there was a linear trend, F(1, 351) = 30.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08, but no 
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quadratic trend, F(1, 351) = .86, p = .36, ηp
2 = .00, for the number of responses per 
person that were not included in the analysis across groups. Post-hoc Tukey’s HSD 
comparisons revealed that the high openness group had a greater number of responses per 
person that were not included in the network analysis (M = 2.20) than the moderate (M = 
1.37, p = .001) and low (M = .92, p < .001) openness groups. Moderate and low openness 
groups did not differ in the average number of responses per person that were not 
included in the network analysis (p = .12). So, although the high openness group 
provided significantly more responses per person, they also had significantly more 
responses that were not included in the network analysis per person. The number of 
responses per person that were included in the network analysis showed a marginal linear 
trend, F(1, 351) = 3.37, p = .067, ηp
2 = .00, but no quadratic trend, F(1, 344) = .39, p = 
.53, ηp
2 = .00, across the openness groups. 
Association Slope 
 Figure 3 depicts the proportion of each response for each openness group—high 
(blue), moderate (orange), low (grey). The log-transformed frequency proportions are at 
50% transparency and appear behind the linear trendline. A linear trendline was added to 
determine the slope and intercept for each group. The fit for each line was good for each 
openness group: high (R2 = .89), moderate (R2 = .92), and low (R2 = .90). The high 
openness group had a numerically smaller slope (m = -.031) than both the moderate (m = 
-.033) and the low (m = -.035) openness groups. The high openness group also had a 
numerically smaller intercept (b = 3.88) than both the moderate (b = 3.91) and the low (b 
= 3.95) openness groups. This analysis was repeated for ordering that was fit—largest to 
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smallest frequency proportions—for each group (Figure 3). The group-specific ordering 
improved the linear fit for all groups: high (R2 = .96), moderate (R2 = .97), and low (R2 = 
.98). Consistent with the comparison across groups, the high openness group had a 
numerically smaller slope (m = -.032) and intercept (b = 3.94) than the moderate (m = -
.034, b = 3.96) and low (m = -.037, b = 4.03) openness groups. These results qualitatively 
demonstrate that the high openness group has a smaller slope and intercept than the other 
openness groups, which suggests that they have a flatter association slope for the 
responses that were included in the network analysis. 
Network Analysis 
 The association correlation networks were constructed from the verbal fluency 
endorsement matrices, using the PMFG filtering procedure. Using these networks, I 
calculated the different network measures of the semantic networks for all groups, which 
were used to quantitively examine the differences between them. To visualize the 
networks, open-sourced Cytoscape software (Shannon et al., 2003) was used and each 
node was labelled using each fluency response included in the analysis. Nodes are 
indicated by red circles and the edges are represented by the black lines between the 
nodes. The edges do not indicate association strength (i.e., unweighted) or the direction 
of relations (i.e., undirected), but indicate the association between two nodes. 
There were numerical (i.e., network measures) and qualitative (i.e., visualization) 
differences of each network structure between the groups. Most notably, the moderate 
openness group was much different than the other two groups in network measures and 
appears structurally different (Figure 3). The moderate openness group was visually 
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much more spread out than the other two groups, which is apparent in the larger diameter 
and longer average shortest path lengths (Table 3). Moreover, the moderate openness 
group had a smaller clustering coefficient than the other two groups. Overall, these 
metrics are all reflected in the lower small-worldness metric of the moderate openness 
group. Interestingly, the low and high openness semantic networks were comparable on 
qualitative and most numerical assessments. The modularity measure, however, differed 
across all groups, decreasing linearly. This suggests that the networks are getting less 
rigid and compartmentalized as openness increased. In summary, 1) the high and low 
openness networks were relatively comparable, 2) the moderate openness group differed 
on all measures, and 3) the rigidity across all networks decreased linearly. 
Bootstrapped Partial Network Analysis 
 The bootstrapped partial analysis was applied to statistically examine the 
differences in network structure across the openness groups. For each network, there 
were 1,000 samples for each network measure (CC, ASPL, Q, S, and D). Polynomial 
ANOVAs were used to determine linear and quadratic patterns in the bootstrapped partial 
networks and Tukey’s HSDs were used to examine individual group differences (Figure 
4). 
Clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient had a significant quadratic 
trend, F(1, 2997) = 19.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = .01, with the moderate openness group having a 
higher CC than the other openness groups. There was no linear trend, F(1, 2997) = 2.38, 
p = .12 ηp
2 = .00. Pairwise comparison revealed that the moderate openness group was 
significantly larger than both the low (p = .007) and the high (p < .001) openness groups. 
34 
The high openness group did not significantly differ from the low openness group (p = 
.27). 
Average shortest path length. There was significant linear trend found for the 
average shortest path length, F(1, 2997) = 29.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .01. There was no 
quadratic trend, F(1, 2997) = .38, p = .54, ηp
2 = .00. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
that high openness group had a significantly smaller ASPL than the low openness group 
(p < .001) and a marginally smaller ASPL than the moderate openness group (p =.073). 
Moreover, the moderate openness group was significantly smaller than the low openness 
group (p = .003). 
Modularity. There was a linear trend for modularity, F(1, 2997) = 15.72, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .01, but no quadratic trend, F(1, 2997) = .02, p = .90, ηp
2 = .00. Pairwise 
comparison revealed the high openness group was significantly different from the low 
openness group (p < .001) but not the moderate openness group (p = .15). The moderate 
openness group was marginally different from the low openness group (p =.092). 
Diameter. The diameter showed a significant linear trend, F(1, 2997) = 13.73, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .01, but no quadratic trend, F(1, 2997) = 1.27, p = .26, ηp
2 = .00. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that high openness had a significantly smaller diameter than the low 
openness group (p = .001) but was no different from the moderate openness group (p = 
.65). The moderate openness group had a significantly smaller diameter than the low 
openness group (p = .013). 
Small-worldness. The small-worldness measure had a marginally significant 
linear trend, F(1, 2997) = 3.35, p = .067, ηp
2 = .00, which was supported by the linear 
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effect of the ASPL and diminished by the quadratic effect of the CC. There was no 
quadratic trend for the small-worldness measure, F(1, 2997) = 1.96, p =.16 ηp
2 = .00. 
Pairwise comparison revealed that the marginal linear trend was driven by a marginally 
larger small-worldness measure for the high openness group compared to the moderate 
openness group (p = .084). The low openness group did not differ from the high (p = .16), 
and the moderate (p = .95) openness groups. Consequently, the high openness group had 
a numerically larger small-worldness value compared to the other groups while the 
moderate and low openness groups were comparable (Figure 4). 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 The present study was the first to examine the relationship between semantic 
network structure and openness to experience. The results demonstrate that varying levels 
of openness to experience have different associative structures. For example, open people 
tended to come up with more individual responses, more unique responses, and they 
typically started with less conventional responses than people lower in openness. This 
evidence suggests that people high in openness have a flatter association hierarchy—
conventional associations are not overly dominant and permit other, less probable 
associations—compared to moderate and low openness groups (Mednick, 1962). 
Moreover, the high openness group had a numerically smaller association slope 
compared to the other two groups. This finding is taken as a qualitative explanation for a 
flatter association hierarchy. These findings all supported the bootstrapped partial 
network analysis results, with networks becoming less rigid and more interconnected as 
openness increased. Thus, semantic association structure increased in flexibility as 
openness increased. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that open 
people are epitomized by a creative disposition and suggests that associative semantic 
structure underlies the relationship between openness to experience and creativity (Kenett 
et al., 2014; Oleynick et al., 2017). 
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Network Analysis 
The semantic network analysis was done to investigate whether openness to 
experience is related to the organization of semantic associations. The full semantic 
structure suggested that the low and the high openness groups were comparable across 
almost all measures except the modularity measure, while the moderate openness group 
was largely different—more spread out (higher D) and less interconnected (higher 
ASPL)—from the other two groups. The decreasing linear pattern of modularity suggests 
that the networks got more flexible as openness increased. Smaller modularity for the 
high openness group is consistent with those higher in creativity (Kenett et al., 2014). 
Based on the full semantic network measures, it appears that the low openness group had 
the best semantic integration with high modularity and small-worldness measures. The 
high openness group’s results, however, suggest that the full semantic network was the 
most flexible and chaotic (lower Q, ASPL, and high S). These findings might be because 
the low openness group’s full semantic network had a fuller representation of their 
semantic structure—having fewer responses removed and fewer unique responses—while 
the high openness group’s structure had a diminished representation of their full semantic 
structure—more responses were removed and more unique responses. Thus, although 
similar on network metrics, the lack of reduction in responses might have made the low 
openness group’s structure better integrated by comparison. This might also account for 
the structural differences seen in the moderate openness group. It’s likely that the 
moderate group’s semantic representation was not as diminished but also not as 
represented as the other groups. This seems to be suggested by more individual responses 
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than the low but not high openness group. Moreover, the moderate openness group could 
have had more a stereotypical structure of associations. This interpretation could be 
supported by greater semantic structure (moderate Q and high ASPL) exhibited by the 
moderate openness group. Overall, the full semantic network structures revealed some 
unexpected results that are difficult to interpret. 
Bootstrapped Partial Network Analysis 
The bootstrapped partial network analysis findings proved to be more compatible 
with my expectations compared to the full network findings. In line with my hypotheses, 
there were several linear effects that suggested as openness increased, the semantic 
structures became more creative in organization—increased flexibility and 
interconnectivity between associations. Kenett and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that 
highly creative people have a greater clustering coefficient, shorter average shortest path 
lengths, a smaller modularity measure, and a larger small-worldness measure than people 
low in creative ability. My results were nearly identical: people higher in openness had a 
shorter ASPL, smaller Q, smaller D, and larger S than people lower in openness. 
One difference between Kenett et al.’s (2014) findings and my results was the 
clustering coefficient. Kenett et al. (2014) found a larger CC for the high creative group 
compared to the low creative group. In Kenett et al.’s (2016a) study, however, lower CC 
was related to higher creative achievement. My study found no difference between high 
and low openness groups, but revealed a larger CC for the moderate openness group. 
Thus, Kenett et al. (2016a) and my results do not contradict Kenett et al. (2014), but they 
suggest a subtle difference between studies. One possibility for this difference might be 
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the measurement of semantic associations—Kenett and colleagues (2014) used free-recall 
associates for target words, while Kenett et al. (2016a) and I used cued-recall associates 
for animal verbal fluency. A lower CC for cued-recall associates, for example, might 
reflect less localized associations and greater switching between sub-categories of 
animals. This would be in line with the interpretation that the moderate openness group 
had more stereotypical associations, which could potentially indicate sticking within a 
localized area of associations (e.g., higher ASPL and higher CC in the full semantic 
network). In free-recall, however, larger CC might reflect smaller decreases in semantic 
relatedness between local associations. Despite differences in methodology, however, 
there is considerable overlap in the results between these studies. 
An important consideration in the context of the bootstrapped partial network 
analysis results is the interpretation of what a larger small-worldness measure means. It 
can be interpreted as greater flexibility but it can also be interpreted as a more chaotic 
network. For example, Kenett et al. (2016a) examined high and low creative achievement 
and fluid intelligence semantic network structures, using animal verbal fluency, and 
found the highest S was related to low creative achievement and low fluid intelligence. 
The high creative achievement groups were between the highest and lowest small-
worldness measure, with the high fluid intelligence and low creative achievement having 
the smallest S. In contrast, higher ASPL and modularity reflected greater structure of the 
network, which was highest for the high fluid intelligence group. Here, the low creative 
achievement and low fluid intelligence group had the lowest modularity and ASPL, 
suggesting decreased structure in the network. Again, high creative achievement groups 
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were neither the lowest or the highest in Q and ASPL. Thus, a balance between structure 
(Q and ASPL) and chaos (S) reflects optimal semantic integration (see Figure 1, and 
Faust & Kenett, 2014). 
Although my findings demonstrate a high S and lower Q measure for the high 
openness group, only the modularity was significant across the groups, with a marginal 
effect for the small-worldness measure. Thus, the flexibility of the networks increased as 
openness increased and there was a lesser effect for an increase in chaoticness. In 
addition, ASPL decreased across groups, suggesting that associations became more 
interconnected as openness increased. This is in line with previous research that found 
creative people have shorter distances between associations (Rossmann & Fink, 2010). 
Therefore, in the context of other network measures, the small-worldness measure seems 
to reflect greater flexibility rather than more chaotic. Thus, I propose that as openness 
increases, semantic structure becomes more like the organization of highly creative 
people (i.e., more flexible and interconnected). 
Finally, the full and partial network analyses produced clear inconsistencies in 
their results. For example, the clustering coefficient findings for the bootstrapped partial 
network analysis were in direct opposition to the full network analysis results. In the 
partial network analysis, the moderate openness group had a significantly larger CC than 
the other openness groups. In contrast, the moderate openness group had a smaller CC 
than the other openness groups in the full semantic networks. The results may imply that 
there are significant structural differences depending upon the size of the semantic 
network. A larger clustering coefficient in the smaller network might suggest increased 
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structural features in a larger network (i.e., larger ASPL) because there is increased 
localization at a smaller scale. The explanations for the differences between full and 
partial networks, however, are unclear, especially for the moderate openness group. So, 
any interpretation for the discrepancy between these results is merely speculation. Future 
work is necessary to try and sort these incongruities. 
Association Slope 
Consistent with previous work which has demonstrated that the proportion of 
word frequencies follow a power-law distribution (known as the Yule-Simon 
distribution), we found that frequencies of animal exemplars also followed this 
distribution (Simon, 1955). When log-transformed, the high openness group had a 
smaller slope than the moderate and low openness groups. Moreover, the moderate 
openness group had a smaller slope than the low openness group. The intercept followed 
the same pattern, with the high openness group having a smaller intercept than the 
moderate openness group, which had a smaller intercept than the low openness group. 
These findings suggest that the high openness group was equal to or less likely than the 
other groups to provide the most common responses, and equal to or more likely to say 
the least common responses. Based on these results, conventional associations were not 
overly dominant for the high openness group, which allowed a greater frequency of less 
probable associations to come to mind. Thus, although qualitative, this finding suggests 
that people higher in openness have a flatter association hierarchy. Moreover, this result 
seems to support the partial bootstrapped network findings, which found shorter paths 
between concepts and reduced rigidity in conceptual categorizations (i.e., smaller Q and 
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larger S measures) as openness increased. Shorter paths between concepts reflects a 
larger likelihood of activation for nearby concepts and reduced rigidity reflects the 
increased probability that local responses could activate disparate others, leading to a 
smaller decrease in the frequency of one response to the next. 
Early Common Responses 
 The proportion of conventional responses of the first, second, and third responses 
of each participant was used to determine whether people high in openness displayed a 
lower dominance of conventional associations at the outset of responding—that is, to see 
if they started with unconventional common category exemplars, biasing their search and, 
in turn, their ability to access to more remote associations. By far, the most common 
responses were dog and cat, which were provided by over 95% of the participants across 
all groups. For the first response, the high openness group was less likely to provide dog 
or cat than the moderate and low openness groups. For the second response, however, the 
high and low openness groups were significantly less likely than the moderate openness 
group to provide either conventional response. The third response showed no differences. 
These results suggest that high openness people were less likely to start with a 
conventional response than the other two groups. This is in line with previous research 
that finds open people to be more original than less open people and that they have a 
tendency towards unconventionality (DeYoung, 2014; DeYoung et al., 2012; McCrae, 
1987; McCrae & Costa, 1997). In the context of spreading activation, people high in 
openness were more likely to reach more remote associations in their semantic network 
43 
because they were inclined to start their search in unconventional locations, increasing 
the likelihood of activating other unconventional concepts (Anderson, 1983). 
Unique Responses 
Unique responses were used as an indicator of remote associations because they 
were less probable responses and were provided by only one group. Previous evidence 
presented in this study suggests that the high openness group should reach more unique 
associations because they have a flexible semantic network structure, a flatter association 
slope, and tend to start in less conventional locations of their semantic network, allowing 
better access to remote responses. Indeed, the high openness group had significantly more 
unique responses than the moderate and low openness groups, which did not differ. This 
finding is consistent with previous research, which demonstrated that people high in 
openness provide a greater number of unique associations (Prabhakaran et al., 2014). 
This evidence also supports the relationship between openness and RAT problem solving, 
as open people are less likely to be biased toward high frequency responses (Benedek et 
al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2012). Therefore, people high in openness and creativity are more 
likely to reach remote associations. Indeed, creative people are less likely to perceive 
disparate concepts as unrelated (Rossmann & Fink, 2010) and they tend to come up with 
more unique associations (Kenett et al., 2014). Overall, these results complement the 
network structure of the high openness group, which had shorter paths between concepts 
and decreased rigidity of categorizations. Thus, people high in openness are more likely 
to be creative in part because they are better able to access more remote responses for 
conceptual recombination (Marupaka, Iyer, & Minai, 2012). 
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Individual Responses 
Finally, as openness increased, the number of individual responses significantly 
increased, suggesting broader knowledge of the animal category. This is consistent with 
previous work that suggests people high in openness have a broader range of knowledge 
than people lower in the trait (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Ashton et al., 2000). Given 
that there was a one minute time limit, it’s possible that there were no differences in the 
breadth of the knowledge but the cognitive processes underlying knowledge retrieval. For 
example, working memory has been shown to facilitate semantic retrieval (Unsworth et 
al., 2014). Therefore, executive processes could underlie the speed of search and retrieval 
of associations. Because, however, openness is linked to working memory (DeYoung et 
al., 2009; Kane et al., 2017), the contributions of executive processes are confounded in 
this study. Qualitative inspection of the unique responses revealed both depth and breadth 
of responses, which seems to suggest that both executive and associative processes might 
underlie semantic retrieval in people high in openness. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 One limitation of this study was its inability to parse out executive and associative 
processes underlying the relationship between openness and creativity. Although 
differences in semantic network structure suggests associative processes are mainly 
responsible, the nature of the task makes isolating specific contributions difficult. Verbal 
fluency associations are likely driven by associative and executive processes. For 
example, verbal fluency represents a structured form of recall that involves executive 
processes such as controlled and strategic search (Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2013, 
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2014). In comparison, free recall of associations related to a target word might rely on 
more associative processes because knowledge of a specific category is not required. 
Thus, future research should examine the semantic structure of free recall associations 
and openness to experience to see if associative processes specifically underlie the 
relationship between openness and creativity. 
In addition, openness to experience can be split into lower-order aspects, 
Openness and Intellect (DeYoung et al., 2007), so it’s worth examining how they 
differentially relate to verbal fluency semantic structure. For example, openness has been 
shown to be more related to creative achievement (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011) while 
intellect has been shown to be more associated with working memory (DeYoung et al., 
2009; Kaufman et al., 2010) and fluid intelligence (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). 
Investigating these differences would also provide more fine-grained evidence of 
openness’s relationship to creativity. Current cognitive theories of creativity suggest that 
associative (Mednick, 1962) and executive (Benedek et al., 2014) processes influence 
creative thinking (Beaty et al., 2014, 2016; Sowden et al., 2015) and semantic network 
structure (Kenett et al., 2016a). Already, there is strong evidence for the relationship 
between semantic creativity and openness to experience in their shared overlap of 
neurological markers (Beaty et al., 2017; Beaty, Silvia, & Benedek, 2017; Beaty et al., 
under review). Another limitation of this study was that the association slope was an 
arbitrary method of examining a flat association hierarchy. Future analyses should 
examine the emergence of associations using dynamic analysis of semantic structure. 
Evaluating the time-dependent development of responses as they are provided would 
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allow precise measurement of a flat association hierarchy over time. Mednick (1962) 
suggests that a flat association hierarchy should steadily produce responses and gradually 
get more remote over time, whereas a steep association hierarchy should produce a 
number of responses early on but rapidly decrease in production with fewer responses 
over time. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the present study used a network science methodology to examine 
the structure of semantic associations for varying levels of openness to experience. I 
found that as openness increases, the semantic network structure became more flexible 
and interconnected, providing an organization that was conducive for creative cognition. 
Consequently, associations between concepts were more accessible through shorter paths 
(i.e., lower ASPL) and the rigidity of these associations decreased (i.e., lower Q and 
higher S). Behavioral analyses complemented these network findings, with a greater 
number of individual and unique associations for the high openness group. These 
findings provide support for differences in the structure of semantic memory as a 
cognitive factor that facilitates the relationship between openness and creativity. In 
addition, this study provides evidence that differences in personality may have direct 
implications for the structure and recall of semantic information (Kwantes et al., 2016). 
Further investigation into the semantic structure of the lower-order aspects of the 
openness to experience, for instance, might reveal differential contributions of cognitive 
processes that underlie each aspect, which would provide additional evidence of the 
openness-creativity relationship.
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
Table 1 
Hypotheses for the Network Measures. 
DV Expected Effect 
(if any) 
Interpretation 
Clustering Coefficient (CC) none none 
Average Shortest Path Length 
(ASPL) 
Negative As openness increases, networks will become less spread out and more condensed, suggesting 
increased interconnectivity between associations. 
Modularity (Q) Negative As openness increases, networks will become less rigid and compartmentalized, suggesting 
decreased categorization of groupings. 
Diameter (D) Negative Networks will become more condensed as openness increases. 
Small-worldness (S) Positive As openness increases, networks will be more clustered and have shorter path lengths, which 
suggests greater flexibility and efficiency between associations. 
6
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics. 
 Age Openness Total Number of 
Responses 
Number of Responses Used in 
Network Analysis 
Sample Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 
Full (n = 497) 19.86 (4.15) 18 – 58 3.61 (.522) 2.25 – 4.83 17.58 (4.42) 2 – 34 —  — 
Low Openness (n = 118) 20.26 (5.99) 18 – 58 2.94 (.207) 2.25 – 3.17 16.58 (4.42) 5 – 27 15.68 (4.01) 5 – 26 
Moderate Openness (n = 121) 19.20 (2.51) 18 – 32 3.62 (.091) 3.50 – 3.75 17.24 (4.48) 8 – 29 15.87 (3.69) 8 – 24 
High Openness (n = 115) 20.26 (3.84) 18 – 47 4.32 (.209) 4.08 – 4.83 18.79 (4.07) 9 – 28 16.59 (3.67) 8 – 28 
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Table 3 
Unique Responses from the Openness Groups. 
Low Moderate High High Continued 
Caterpillar Anaconda Amoeba Lory 
Catfish Bald Eagle Angel Fish Macaw 
Centaur Bearded Dragon Axolotl Marmoset 
Fruit Fly Bearded Lizard Babel Fish Okapi 
Gnat Black Lab Badger Osprey 
Grouper Blowfish Barracuda Oyster 
Honey Bee Bonobo Beagle Peacock 
Hound Bronco Binturong Phoenix 
Hummingbird Chocolate Lab Blue Whale Pit Bull 
Kiwi Dragonfly Boa Constrictor Pit Viper 
Mink Gibbon Boxer Plankton 
Muskrat Hornet Brown Bear Poison Dart Frog 
Orca Husky Bumblebee Praying Mantis 
Reindeer Komodo Dragon Capybara Puffin 
Reptile Lion Fish Cayman Pygmy Goat 
Russian Blue Mammoth Chickadee Red Wolf 
Shih Tzu Mermaid Crane Salmon 
Sperm Whale Midge Cuttlefish Sand Flea 
Water Bear Mountain Hyrax Deer Mouse Sea Cucumber 
Wildcat Naked Mole Rat Dik Dik Sea Horse 
Wolverine Pheasant Dingo Shiba Inu 
 Piranha Doberman Shrew 
 Red Panda Dodo Skink 
 Rhesus Dugong Small-Mouth Bass 
 Sea Sponge Egret Snow Leopard 
 Sea Urchin Flea Sunfish 
 Tasmanian Devil Flying Squirrel Swordfish 
 Tiger Shark Galago Tapeworm 
 Tuna Gray Wolf Tegu 
 Water Buffalo House Fly Tick 
 Whale Shark Ibis T-Rex 
 Wombat Jackalope Wallaby 
 Yellow Jacket Large-Mouth Bass Weasel 
  Lop Bunny White-Tailed Deer 
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Table 4 
Full Semantic Network Statistics. 
 Openness Group 
Network Measure Low Moderate High 
CC 0.61 0.59 0.61 
ASPL 3.58 4.24 3.49 
Q 0.62 0.58 0.55 
S 9.26 8.39 9.68 
D 7 10 7 
CCrand 0.05 0.05 0.05 
ASPLrand 2.76 2.75 2.74 
Note: CC, clustering coefficient; ASPL, average shortest path length; Q, modularity; S, 
small-worldness; D, diameter; CCrand, clustering coefficient of random graph; 
ASPLrand, average shortest path length of random graph. 
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Example of Network Types. Adapted from Watts and Strogatz (1998), this figure depicts 
examples of regular, small-world, and random networks. As the probability of random 
rewiring (p) increases, so to does the randomness of the connections in the network. A 
small-world network is situated between rigid structure and random connections. 
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Figure 2 
High and Low Creative Semantic Networks. Semantic networks in low (A) and high (B) 
creative groups. Reprinted from Kenett et al. (2014).
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Association Slope Across and Within-Groups. Log-transformed frequency proportions plotted for comparison across groups 
(top) and each log-transformed frequency proportions of each openness group (bottom): high (right), moderate (middle), and 
low (bottom). The x-axis for the comparison across groups is ordered from the most common response to the least common 
response and displays each individual response. The x-axis for each group’s frequency proportion graphs are ordered from the 
most common response to the least common response within that group and displays every other response. 
7
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Figure 4 
Full Semantic Network Structure of Each Group. Full semantic network structure of each 
openness group: high (top), moderate (middle), and low (bottom). 
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Figure 5 
Bootstrapped Partial Network ANOVAs. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
